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CIVILIZATION: A DEFINITION
Part II. The nature of formal knowledge
systems.*

JOHN K. HORD
Abstract.
Part I of this paper hypothesized the existence of formal knowledge
systems, systematized integrations of ideology and data which were proposed to be the core and defining elements of individual civilizations.
The Catholic Church, modern science, and Marxism-Leninism were
mentioned as examples. Thus it was further proposed that a movement
between civilizations in space or time can be usefully described as a
movement between such formal knowledge systems, such that for example, a journey from medieval Europe to medieval China could be
called a movement from Catholic to Buddhist civilization. But this cannot be all the story; Buddhism for example still existed in medieval
India and is not usually considered part of the same civilization as
medieval China and Japan; both Europe and Byzantium recognized
Christianity, but are also generally considered separate civilizations.
This second part of the paper will first assault certain Western preconceptions of the nature of civilization and will then propose a generalized classification and structure which is suggested to apply to all formal
knowledge systems.
The concept "formal knowledge system" seems straightforward
enough: Catholicism, science, Marxism-Leninism were all cited as
examples and are all well-established schools of thought and
knowledge. Collecting these labels under a single higher order of
classification seems unexceptionable. But application of a single
label implies knowledge of the meaning of the label, and when
one examines the many different formal knowledge systems that
have existed in history, a certain amount of prejudgment according to the values of one's own knowledge system is bound to
creep in. Most historians for example place great value on complexity; the more complex a system the better, so that such things
as cities and writing and hierarchy tend to give a prospective civilization higher marks than it would otherwise receive. But there is
•"Civilization: A Definition Part I" was published in Comparative
Civilizations Review 25 (Fall 1991): 28-51.
Ill
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nothing in the concept "formal knowledge systems" that intrinsically makes complexity a virtue. Consider for example medieval
Ireland.
O n e o f the challenges a civilization may face to its identity is
the onset o f severe pressure from a more developed civilization.
Can a "civilization," without cities and other traits often cited as
necessary to the type, retain its integrity in the face of such external pressure? It is quite certain that in ancient times the Roman
Empire, with its cities, writing, industries, administrations, etc.,
was vasdy more developed technically than was the island o f Ireland at the time. But Rome fell, and its civilization was replaced
by a new one based on Christian models (Hord 1987). Ireland
was at this time a land o f petty kings, whose literacy was at best
questionable, and n o cities, towns, or even villages. But it had a
highly developed culture (whether or not one admits the label
"civilization"), exemplified by the intricate permutations of the
Brehon Law. During the early Middle Ages Christianity, a formal
knowledge system utterly alien and repugnant to the rulers o f
Classical Greece and Rome, became the center o f European and
Byzantine civilization. Ireland was also converted. But the reception that Christianity received in Ireland was vasdy different from
the o n e it got in Europe and Byzantium.
If Christianity had 'triumphed' more or less peacefully [in Ireland],
it had been at a considerable price. It was regarded as an additional
enrichment to life; for many it had the attraction of dramatic entertainment, for some individuals it was their sole purpose in life; but for the
population at large, it was by no means an all-embracing way of l i f e . . . .
The law tracts of the eighth century . . . only take passing notice of the
Christianisation of the country. . . . In addition, monogamy was not the
rule in medieval Ireland, Christianity having changed nothing in this
regard. Contrary to Christian concepts, marriages were dissolved in
agreement with Irish law. . . . It is at least certain that Christian kings in
England attempted to consolidate their position through Christianity.
Once again, there is nothing comparable in Ireland. The petulant word
of an Irish bishop in 1711 that there had been no martyrs in Ireland
before the arrival of the English is appropriate here. . . . This raises a
question as to what extent the office of king in Ireland was subject to
Christian influences. In view of the fact that the community was nominally Christian, this influence was surprisingly small. Adomnan tells of
how Colum Cille ordained Aedan, king of the Ui Neill, by the laying on
of hands at the command of an angel who appeared to him three times:
imponens manern super caput eius ordinans benedixit (VC108a). Whether
this 'ordination' was to have any influence on the office of the ruler is
not evident. Adoman's account makes it possible to postulate the
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anointing of kings in Ireland at this time although it is possible, if not
certain, that some Irish kings were anointed towards the end of the
eighth century. Aed mac Neill of Tara (797) was given the epithet
Oirdnide (from Latin ordinatus) and, by that time, the anointing of
rulers had already reached England from the kingdom of the Franks. If
Aed was anointed, which is by no means certain, it would have been due
to outside influences. In Ireland, the anointing of rulers was at best
passing fashion. [Richter 1988:33, 60, 66-67, 87]
Thus it would seem that Ireland's reception of Christianity was
highly selective, and so also that one case is proven in which a
civilization's low level of technology and organization did not
necessarily hinder at all its ability to retain its integrity in the face
of foreign blandishments. The, so to speak, "civilizational effectiveness" of the west Celtic synthesis of the first millennium AD is
also indicated in that in Britain, after 350 years of Roman occupation, the successor states of the Empire and the other political
and social survivals of the imperial period were quite generally
Celtic, not Roman.
This relative question of complexity also raises the absolute
question of size. How many people are necessary before a "civilization" can be said to exist? Here again our own urbanism tends
to distort our judgment. Ireland, as just noted, had no cities,
towns, nor even villages during the Middle Ages, but resisted
amalgamation into Western Christian civilization anyway. If one
wants to find the minimum population for a civilization, the obvious tactic is to trace the civilization back to its beginning and simply estimate its population at the lowest point. In practice, since
there have been successive civilizations in most places, this means
tracing civilization itself back to its origin from a pre-civilized
condition.
Part I of this paper quoted Gordon Willey's nomination of
Olmec Mesoamerica and Chavin Peru ca. 1200 BC as such initial
integrations; Hord (1981) also nominated Catal Huyuk in
Anatolia of the seventh millennium BC and Mississippian North
America ca. AD 1200 as others of the type. The central site of
Chavin Peru remains in dispute, but population estimates are
available for the other three. Catal Huyuk is estimated to have
had a population of 3,000 [Fairservis 1975:158] to at least 5,000
[Mellaart 1975:99]. San Lorenzo, the principal site of the early
Olmecs, and its two satellite villages are estimated to have had a
total population of 2,250 [Marcus 1976:79-89]. In Mississippian
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North America, Moundville and Etowah are estimated at "many
more than two thousand" [O'Brien 1972:196], the smaller sites of
Angel and Kincaid, "1000 or slighdy more" [Griffin 1978:26s] 1 .
When the de Soto expedition passed through the periphery of
the Mississippian culture area in 1539-40, its members "repeatedly remarked in their accounts that all the Southeastern Indians
were alike . . . liv[ing] in large communities and depend[ing] on
agriculture for much of their f o o d " [Hudson 1976:10]; their
towns ranged in size f r o m 1700 to 4500 p e o p l e " (Gibson
1974:131).
As the above figure suggests, a civilization can be initiated by a
rather small number of persons. It can also be sustained by a very
small number. It is well known that Polynesian culture was hierarchically and culturally developed, albeit preliterate and pre-urban, and was cohesive enough to remain essentially the same
even when scattered all around the Pacific Ocean. It is also well
known to have maintained this culture on islands with populations in the low thousands, and "so small an atoll as Ifaluk supports a complex order of genealogical ranks among a population
of only 500 persons who live mainly by fishing [and it] is not exceptional in this respect" [Goldman 1970:xx].
There is also the issue of stability regarding non-complex formal knowledge systems. Such systems may evolve with ease but
can they sustain themselves? In the absence of increasing complexity, will they return to a pre-civilized status? Here the best
case in evidence would seem to be subsaharan Africa, traditionally a continent reserved for anthropological inquiry rather than
historical, which presents a remarkable example of isolation of
member units with no great divergence or disintegration reported in consequence.
Stretching right across Africa from the Red Sea to the mouth of the
Senegal, and right down the central highland spine of Bantu Africa
from the Nile sources to Southern Rhodesia [now Zimbabwe], we find
the axis of what we shall call the Sudanic civilization. The central feature of this civilization was the incorporation of the various African
peoples concerned into states whose institutions were so similar that
they must have derived from a common source. At the head of such
states there were kings, to whom divine honors were paid, and to whom
divine powers were attributed. The king led a life sedulously excluded
from the common people; he gave public audience from behind a curtain; not even the most intimate of his courtiers might see him eat or
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drink. Each year the king hoed the first plot of farming land and sowed
the first seeds. . . .
The divine king's subjects might number anywhere from a few thousand to a million, or even more. Such kingdoms tended in fact to form
in clusters, with one or more large kingdoms at the center of the cluster, and a host of smaller ones scattered around the peripheries. But on
however small and ineffective a scale, such kingdoms would nearly always show at least vestigial traces of a strongly centralized political structure, contrasting sharply with the loose family or lineage institutions of
those societies which had never been organized in this way. The typical
"Sudanic" state was not feudal. It was not based on the hereditary position and power of great families within the state. It was in principle
something nearer to a bureaucracy—a bureaucracy without paper, ink,
desks, or telephones—in which power was wielded by officials, who held
their offices during the king's pleasure, and who could be transferred
from post to post, promoted, demoted, or even destituted by a nod of
the divine head or a syllable from the divine mouth. Around the royal
person circled a galaxy of tided office bearers, as numerous as the economic organization of each state was able to support. The pre-eminent
offices were nearly always those of the Queen Mother, the Queen Sister,
and a limited number of titled "great wives" of the ruler. At the head of
the administration were a few high officials, often four in number.
From these depended a descending hierarchy of provincial and district
chiefs, often recruited from the pages, sons or nephews of the great,
who had been educated at court. [Oliver and Page 1962:44, 45]
This system was at least six centuries old when the West arrived,
(Davidson 1966:97) and may well be as much as eight thousand
years old. Thus, the insistence on a complexity level comparable
to a Near Eastern model would be inappropriate for subsaharan
Africa.
Hypothetically, it could be argued that pre-literate people remain pre-civilized regardless of the stability of their system. However the present work will refute those sources that arbitrarily
establish such things as writing, cities, and large-scale
sociopolitical organization as decisive factors reflecting a civilized
state. Classical Greece is a perfect example that civilization can
exist under "non-literate" circumstances. It is universally known
that the civilization o f Classical Greece developed f r o m a
nonliterate period, called the Hellenic Dark Age. This Dark Age
was an intermediate stage between "civilized" Classical Greece
and an earlier Mycenaean culture that was highly developed and
literate. The Greeks themselves date their civilization from
Mycenaean times and trace its development through the dark age
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to the classical era. Thus, according to the Greeks, key elements
of classical civilization were carried across an age so dark that the
writing system itself was lost, and had to be re-invented in an entirely new script.
Advocates of literacy as a necessary condition for civilization
may try to diminish the Greek emphasis on their Mycenaean
roots or they might argue that people can move in and out of a
state of "civilization" based on the presence or absence of writing,
but the ancient Greeks themselves would not have agreed with
such judgments. Based upon the Greek assessment of their own
past it would appear that literacy is not essential to civilization,
and those who try to make it a precondition exercise an arbitrary
judgment. While literacy is useful in the process of civilizational
development, it is not essential. While formal knowledge systems
are difficult to define archaeologically, there is no evidence that
when one system dies and is replaced by another, the people involved revert to a pre-civilized condition. Historically, there is n o
evidence that this has ever occurred.
There is one final thing that formal knowledge systems are not;
they are not bound by territorial limits. The modern Western
mind loves visions of maps and territoriality, and so tends to see
"civilizations" in terms of maps of the territory they occupy. Thus,
to the modern mind the hypothesis "civilization = formal knowledge system + people" will appear to be virtually a violation of
natural law because the term "formal knowledge system" is unrelated to the notion of territory. The problem created by this distinction is most acute for anthropologists who tend to see the
state/civilization/territory as a fused whole. For those scholars,
any discussion of the state and civilization without regard to territory becomes nonsensical. Discussion of the relationship between
formal knowledge systems and states has been made elsewhere
(Hord 1989), so for the moment, suffice to say that in terms of
formal knowledge systems, n o intrinsic connection between the
state/civilization and territory appears at any level of analysis. It is
quite possible for one formal knowledge system to exist totally
contained within the geographic territory of another, and such
instances have in fact occurred. The position of the Jews in medieval and modern Europe is an obvious example, and the Gypsies
have been even less bound to a particular territory.
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After all those caveats about what a formal knowledge system is
not, it remains finally to suggest what it is. Just how does one apply that label "formal knowledge system?"
For purposes of this initial exposition, the term will be defined
as pragmatically as possible, with no attempt at an absolute and
final definition. While it is quite possible that one particular formal knowledge system may be correct in its definition of itself, it
is certain that more can be learned by studying the thoughts of
different civilizations on the subject. It is equally certain that no
definition could possibly include everything that might be known
about the nature of knowledge. There is just too much universe
out there for mankind even to pretend at finality. Therefore this
paper will attempt only to define the words "formal knowledge
system" as they might be used in practice across many civilizations. Thus the word "knowledge" will refer simply to "data held
to be sufficientiy factual as to constitute a valid basis for action."
The word "factual" will be left to each civilization to define in its
own terms. "System" means any arrangement of data such that the
arrangement itself becomes one of the data. The word "formal"
conveys a sense of permanent establishment which the words
"knowledge system" do not provide by themselves and so is used
when the full technical label seems desirable.
One may hypothesize a "formal knowledge system" which does
nothing but control the positions of 60 marbles in a game of
Chinese checkers, but this would hardly seem a sufficient base on
which to build a civilization.2 Civilizations have greater concerns
than that: everything from the techniques of farming, fishing, and
the rearing of the next generation to the causes behind the stars
in the sky, from frosts and droughts to marriage, motherhood,
and society itself. Thus, some major degree of universality is
proper to a formal knowledge system: indeed, a pretension to
complete universality is an intrinsic characteristic forced by the
very nature of such systems as keys to an entire civilization. This is
only partly correct. Consider for example three words which are
often used in connection with classifications of knowledge: philosophy, science, and religion. "Science" and "religion" have already been mentioned as formal knowledge systems in these
pages and philosophers would be likely to enter their own claim.
How would one differentiate among these three distinct kinds
of knowledge? "Philosophy" in particular has had very widespread
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applications in the past and for purposes o f this paper several o f
its older meanings will be deleted from consideration, primarily
those involving ontology, epistemology, and what used to be
called "natural philosophy." The first two are deleted as being
intracivilizational points o f theory, while the last, "natural philosophy," has become "science." "Philosophy" will here be limited
to the modern popular usage o f the word, that being the wisdom
concerning man, such as Epicureanism and Stoicism. With this
restriction, one may propose a useful differentiation among philosophy, science, and religion o n the basis o f the supposed separation between man and nature:
Philosophy: any systematized presentation of the relationship between
man and the universe.
Science: any systematized presentation of the relationship between nature and the universe.
Religion: any systematized presentation of the entire universe, including
both man and nature and also gods and the supernatural (if any).
Thus, philosophies are herein proposed, as based o n modern
popular usage, to be intrinsically man-centered while sciences are
intrinsically nature-centered. It is impossible for a science to differentiate man intrinsically from any other thing in nature, except o n the same basis as applies to all other things in nature, or
by assuming a priori that man is different and outside the normal
scientific rules. Religion on the other hand can include both
philosophies and sciences and can have any rules it likes. A religion can, for example, both admit that man is an intrinsically
special entity and then abhor and deplore the very existence o f
such a separation, labelling it a fall from grace which the religion
claims to put right again. But even here there are limits. Because
under this definition religions claim applicability to the entire
universe, any intrinsic differentiation o f man must be handled
very carefully lest it challenge the very unity o f the universe that is
a foundation o f any knowledge system's claim to exist.
Can a civilization be built solely around a philosophy, so defined? One may conceive of the possibility o f a totalistic rule o f
society by philosopher-kings, excluding all other knowledge systems, but to the best of my knowledge it has never happened.
Man-centered descriptions are useful for many things, but there
are just too many other things in life for which they are not useful
(e.g. the very basic item o f farming, which has supported most
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people through most o f history). Philosophies may be useful
guides to the activities of man as ruler and as citizen and may
serve as auxiliary knowledge systems for that special purpose, either within a religious knowledge system or by themselves. But to
create a basis for all the activities that comprise a civilization,
something is needed beyond philosophy.
Can a civilization be built solely around a science, so described? This may theoretically be possible, so long as the civilization either includes a priori assumptions granting special status to
man and perhaps other things, or is prepared to accept that physical nature is all there is. But this is a very difficult admission to
make. Thus, while Experimental Science is one o f the most prevalent formal knowledge systems in the world today, it is always as
an auxiliary system, never as the principal system on which the
civilization is based. O n e may doubt that even the positivists were
willing to follow the philosophical consequences o f an absolute
rule of science to their final conclusion.
Can a civilization then be built solely around a religion, so described? The preceding discussion o f Europe, Byzantium, India,
and China suggests this to be an obvious possibility. Does this
mean that all formal knowledge systems are religions? It does not.
Here the usefulness o f having multiple formal knowledge systems enters the picture. These have been seen in Part I in India
and China and also in medieval Europe with the invention o f
modern Experimental Science. But the United States was also
noted to be consistendy employing three separate knowledge systems:
Christianity: a religion, covering all man and nature, as an unofficial but
hardly uninfluendal system.
Experimental Science: a science, covering the relationship of nature to the
universe and including man in such crucial fields as medicine.
Nationalism: a description of the relationship of man to (a limited and
described portion of) the universe, and so in the terms of this paper
a philosophy.
Each o f these claims some portion o f universality, but only religion claims it all. Most of the formal knowledge systems that
have stood at the centers o f the various civilizations have been
religions, claiming, at least potentially, a complete understanding
of the universe. But many such systems have existed that are, like
nationalism and experimental science, qualified only with the
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oxymoron "limited universality," complete application only
within their described fields. Indeed, considering the events
noted in Part I in Europe, India, and China when their religious
knowledge systems began to lose their monopolies, one may suggest that the creation of such specialized and limited auxiliary formal knowledge systems is a signature of well-developed civilizations.
With the relationships between formal knowledge systems and
civilizations having been described, let us now turn to an examination of the internal structure of formal knowledge systems
themselves. What follows is the perspective of an historian, rather
than that of an epistemologist or ontologist, and it is intended to
be purely pragmatic.
Again, one must first eliminate from consideration that basic
question which is generally thought to be the very core of any
knowledge system, i.e., what is knowledge? No consideration will
be given to matters such as the connection between perception
and reality, between symbols and forms. These are theoretical issues to which various civilizations have formulated very different
theories, and by tautology, any characteristic that varies from one
civilization for another cannot be a defining element of all of
them. Whatever may finally prove to be the nature of reality, it is
a problem that stands prior to any questions of the nature of civilization. So here again, ontology and epistemology must for immediate purposes remain beside the point.
Thus, regarding the question of the nature of formal knowledge systems the present work will address only the mechanics
rather than the content of knowing, and then only at the most
basic level. How does a formal knowledge system "know" something? In the present analysis, the interior of a formal knowledge
system may be considered in five layers, rather like an onion
(rather more like the vertical distribution of thermonuclear reactions in aged large stars). At the core are the most central and
unchallengeable elements of the system, herein called covenant;
the three intermediate layers are law, procedure, and myth. (See
Figure 1) In modern computer terminology these are the data of
the system; so in the outermost layer, one finds the processing
equipment, the hardware and the software. In a formal knowledge system the software, changeable and even evanescent, is the
people, ideas, and events which make up the everyday workings of
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the civilization; being changeable and evanescent they do not
have the permanence associated with the other elements of the
system and so will not be addressed here. The "hardware" comprises such things as the language (s) in which knowledge is expressed; one of the major differences between European and
Byzantine civilization for example was in this hardware, because
one recognized Latin, the other Greek, as the language of culture, and so had access only to data readable on that hardware.
The theoretical position of this hardware in a formal knowledge
system is debatable. In principle it could be changed at any time;
in practice, such things as the properly recognized use of Latin
and Greek, and even more of Arabic and Mandarin Chinese in
their civilizations, is given a level of value that ranks close to being
a basic assumption of the proper working of the universe. Such
differences in hardware can cause major differences in the workings of different civilizations, as one may appreciate by mentally
comparing the workings of cuneiform on clay in ancient Sumer
with the possibilities of the modern computer terminal. The influences of each civilization's particular hardware should be kept
in mind when studying that civilization, but they are not classifiable in the same way as the four proposed central elements of
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formal knowledge systems and so will not be further addressed
here.
O f these four central elements the most important of all is covenant. It is proposed herein that the core, the most central and
inviolable element, of a formal knowledge system is a set of assumptions which are unquestionable and irrefutable—"we hold
these truths to be self-evident"—and are, to use an old saw, imparted to each new generation with the mother's milk. With one
exception, it is not necessary that any particular assumptions be
involved; any given formal knowledge system may or may not include the concept of divinity, may or may not include the concept
of centrality, may or may not include the concept of assumption
itself. The defining qualities of these core beliefs are solely that
they are accepted without question and that their acceptance is
shared by essentially all members of the civilization. When the
beliefs cease to be thus shared, the formal knowledge system is
failing; when the constitutional beliefs of a civilization cease to be
shared by its people, the society is failing, breaking down, and
becoming ready for the imposition of new formal knowledge systems that may be radically different from the old. (An analysis of
the end of medieval Europe is presented as an example of this
process in Hord 1989).
The word covenant, from the Hebrew covenant with God, is
hereby suggested as a label for this core of shared beliefs. One
may object that this word already has other uses; for example, this
same word was used by the Massachusetts Puritans to describe
their compact with God. But this Puritan idea of compact and
religious association is actually a very good illustration of the
word "covenant" as used here. The Puritans did indeed feel themselves subscribers to a covenant with God, but they also, in their
own theory, had no power either to change this covenant or to
refuse it:
As the heavens are higher then [sic] the earth, so are the wayes of
God higher then our wayes . . . and in speciall the wayes of his grace,
and of the Covenant thereof, with men indeed mutuall agreement and
consent is necessary to a Covenant, but with God, Gods appointment
maketh a Covenant, whether the Creature consent to an agreement or
no. [Miller 1961:488; source not cited]
It was approximately the same situation as among the ancient
Hebrews, and indeed exacdy from that example; one democratic
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reform was refused precisely because "we should have no warrant
in scripture for it: there was no such government in Israel"
(Morison 1930:92, quoting John Winthrop). Their subscription
to the covenant with God was voluntary and individual, but the
covenant was there and applied to each one of them whether they
subscribed to it or not; any personal, or even community, objections would have no more effect than a proposal by Congress to
amend the law of gravity. The same applies in this proposed label:
Covenant is an accepted community belief about the nature of
the universe, recognized to be a belief, but an irrefutable belief
and no less a fact for being a belief. One may call it a contract, but
it is a contract that is valid and binding regardless of the presence
or absence of consent by the people bound to i t For example,
that formal knowledge system herein called Experimental Science has two basic assumptions in its covenant: 1) that the universe is governed by laws which operate everywhere the same, independent of any and all observers'; 2) that all such laws are
ultimately and fundamentally reducible to mathematics.
Between covenant and the individual components of society
(institutions, extended families; persons, etc . . .) stand three
other elements. The one that touches people most direcdy is
myth, as described in William McNeill's recent book Mythhistoiy.
Myth is both temporal and personal, dealing with events in time
happening to or caused by individuals. The time and the persons
involved in myths may be real or may be imaginary; they may even
be anthropomorphized and, so to speak, "event"-ized qualities of
nature. But although these myths always happen in time, in application they are timeless. Myth in this sense may be perceived as
the translation of the permanent beliefs of a civilization into actual working guidelines for the personal edification of society.
Myth generates role-models for individuals. "George Washington
and the cherry tree" is myth in this sense. Those stories that are
usually considered to be myths, e.g. the legends of the Greek gods
and heroes, are fossils of what once was myth in this sense. One of
the signs of a vital and successful civilization/formal knowledge
system is its ability to create and sustain new myths as new situations arise; contrariwise, the failure of a society may be measured
in the death of its myths. The present situation in American urban ghettos will illustrate. This must be emphasized: the function
and defining quality of myth as presented herein is the connection of civilization with the individual, the acculturation of an
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individual to his civilization. If this can be disproven, then this
proposed concept o f myth is invalid.
In closest proximity to covenant stands "law;" physical, religious, or otherwise. This is the one and only concept that is comm o n to every formal knowledge system. In every system there
exists a set o f inherent rules that are eternal and unchangeable
that govern the universe. The modern world, with its emphasis on
science, associates this quality only with the physical law, but it
applies just as thoroughly to the social and religious laws propounded by any other formal knowledge system. The recent situation inside revolutionary Islamic Iran may provide the non-historian some flavor o f this emphasis on unchangeable ruling law.
Otherwise, the concepts applying in medieval Europe to the relation o f law and society describe the situation as well as any:
To the early medieval mind, king and people together, welded into
a unity which theoretical analysis can scarcely divide, formed the State.
Neither the rule of a monarch whose powers were limited by law, nor
the active legislative co-operation of the community expressed in the
consensus fidelium, was regarded as 'sovereign' in the modern sense.
Sovereignty, if it existed at all, resided in the law which ruled over both
king and community. . . . The blunt 'either-or* of later times—either
the king is unlimited or the people is sovereign—is an impossible dilemma from the standpoint of the early Middle Ages.
Not the State, but 'God is the source of all law'. Law is part of the
world-order; it is unchangeable. It can be twisted or falsified, but then
it restores itself, and at last confounds the evil-doer who meddled with
it. . . .
Germanic and ecclesiastical opinion were firmly agreed on the principle, which met no opposition until the age of Machiavelli, that the
State exists for the realization of the Law; the power of the State is the
means, the Law is the end-in-itself; the monarch is dependent on the
Law, which is superior to him, and on which his own existence is based.
[Kern 1970:70-71, 141, 150-151]
Law is the opposite o f myth, being both impersonal and eternal, the unbreakable commands o f reality. It is different from covenant in that covenant is reality itself, beyond analysis and correction, while law is only a function o f reality. Such law is, both as a
body and individually, unchangeable insofar as human action is
concerned, although if a covenant includes a God whose rule
stands prior to the law, then actual change by Him is theoretically
possible. In practice there is a way even for man to "change" law,
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in that it may be understood or reinterpreted in the light of new
data, even though in theory all such law is eternal. "According to
mediaeval ideas, therefore, the enactment of new law is not possible at all; and all legislation and legal reform is conceived of as
the restoration of the good old law which has been violated [Kern
1970:151]." The recent conservation of the law of parity in physics is an almost identical example. Physical law was not changed;
our understanding of it was merely proven incorrect Experimental Science took this realization about its laws so seriously that the
physicists responsible for making the correction were immediately given the Nobel Prize. Such laws may be quite preposterous
from the point of view of a civilization that does not believe them,
but that is completely irrelevant to civilizations that do believe
them. Law in this sense is the link between covenant and the
universe outside the individual; its function is to form the link
between the individual and his universe outside himself, to make
the universe comprehensible and predictable. As such it too will
often be expressed in myth, in stories illustrating the creation or
working of the law.
Note that in these definitions, both temporal myth and timeless law are open to question, on grounds of new situations
(myth) or lack of proper understanding (law). Thus in spite of
their presumed status as unchanging and eternal, in practice they
can change. Covenant, however, is prior assumption, and is not
supposed to be open to question; questioners are treated either
as madmen (when the covenant is strong) or heretics (when it is
coming under challenge). But although covenant is not supposed
to be open to question, it may in fact change or even collapse
under the impact of changing thought or changing reality. When
this happens it is a very dangerous time for any civilization. Reformulation of such assumptions can be survived when the reformulation is accepted as widely as the covenant itself, but dispute on
this basic a matter can reduce an entire civilization to anarchy.
Covenant is reality, and when reality collapses, the civilization itself can hardly remain. The collapse of medieval Europe, (discussed in Hord 1989), is proposed to be an example of such a
catastrophe.
A more limited conflict may arise when a civilization subscribes
to more than one formal knowledge system. In such a situation
the laws of the different knowledge systems may be in conflict, or
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partisans of one system may try to change the laws of the other (s).
This is illustrated for example by the occasional efforts of American state legislatures to simplify scientific law, for example officially redefining pi [jt] to be an even 3-but even in the present
weakened situation of Christianity, they would not dare try to pass
an Eleventh Commandment. As a rule such conflicts are simply
left unrecognized and unresolved, and a civilization keeps the
peace by refusing to admit that any conflict exists.
Between law and myth lies a more abstract component of the
formal knowledge system, which shall be called "procedure."
While covenant and law are both theoretically eternal, and both
in practice must change with the times, such change cannot be
made at random. "Procedure" is the rules by which changes are
made (or rather, to note the proper theory, by which misunderstandings are corrected and lacunae are filled). In the Christian
religion these are the rules of revelation, exegesis, and interpretation; in Experimental Science they are the rules of theory-formulation and experiment. These rules are not themselves divine revelation and they are not laws of the natural universe; they are not
assumptions nor are they personal experience. They are simply
the accepted ways by which new knowledge may be found, and
since knowledge is the principle subject of knowledge systems,
these procedures also become very carefully indoctrinated and
mythologized verities. But unlike the case with law and covenant,
there is no pretense that procedure is eternal; it is simply what is
proven, understood, and accepted to work. If tomorrow someone
invented a new procedure for determining necessary changes and
convinced the scholars concerned that it actually worked, there
would be no bar against accepting it as proper procedure.
Procedure, so defined, sounds minimally important, even negligible. It is not. One may even assess it to be in practice the most
important component of the four. "Knowledge," the personal
knowledge and personal divine relationships of the Paleolithictype shaman, may have existed longer than the human species
itself, but "knowledge system" implies a packaging that transcends
individuals. Indeed the key event that marked the passage into a
state of civilization, so long ago at Catal Huyuk and among the
Olmecs, the Chavin, and the Mississippians, may have been precisely the invention of a set of rules to make new knowledge valid
or invalid regardless of the shaman proposing it In that discovery
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lies the ability to place any new datum into comprehensible relationships with what is already known, and to turn these data eventually into calendars and cathedrals and the road to the stars.
By way of test, this formulation predicts that certain combinations of knowledge should not occur. Law is suggested to be eternal and impersonal; myth is temporal and personal. Can the
other combinations of these two factors exist? If law is impersonal
and eternal, can there also be a non-eternal law? The idea of a
temporary law of nature seems laughable but perhaps some have
been proposed. Myth is considered to be personal and temporal;
are there any myths which do not include a time-sense? The idea
of the anthropomorphized godhead might be proposed to be
such, but the idea by itself involves no action, and actions take
place in time. Likewise, can there be a law of nature which applies
only personally (i.e. to specific individuals), or a myth which does
not involve people or some other anthropomorphized entities?
Under the hypothesis of formal knowledge systems such combinations are forbidden and at least on first impression they all
seem insupportable.
This paper has suggested two propositions regarding formal
knowledge systems: one, there can be three types of knowledge
systems (philosophies, sciences, and religions); and two, each
type has four key elements (covenant, law, procedure, and myth).
Hardware, individual persons and events are also part of each civilization.
The ruling system in Western civilization today is Experimental Science, a study of nature where truth is determined by independendy repeatable experiments. Experimental Science has so
monopolized Western nature studies in the twentieth century that
no one envisions other forms of nature-study as being legitimate.
While it is agreed that "religion" can take many forms and "philosophy" can take many forms, the same is not true of science.
The current paper rejects the notion of a single science for just as
there are other philosophies and other religions there can also be
other sciences. An example of such an alien science that will also
serve to give the reader a more concrete appreciation ofjust what
is meant by "covenant," "law," "procedure," and "myth" comes
from medieval China.
During the Northern Sung dynasty (AD 960-1126) there
emerged in China several schools of thought known collectively
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as the tao-hsueh (learning o f the tao, called in English Neo-Confucianism; not to be confused with the various schools o f Taoist
philosophy (tao-chia) and religion (tao-chiao) ). The roots of the
tao-hsueh included, besides Confucianism, the Yi-hsueh, one o f the
many esoteric traditions that appeared and flourished during the
Han. The Yi-hsueh, based principally o n the Yi-ching, the Book o f
Changes, had by Northern Sung times developed into two principle schools o f thought; one the famous line o f moral philosophies (Yi-Li hsueh), the other a lesser known tradition which "focused o n cosmology and the functioning o f the universe"—thus a
study o f nature, a science. This was the hsiang-shu hsueh, the "image and number learning," so-called because "images" and numbers constituted two o f its most important basic elements. This
proposed formal knowledge system included first a set o f basic
assumptions which in this paper would be listed as a "covenant":
[The] fundamental assumptions and concepts were associated with
different social groupings. A rough breakdown from the most general
to the most narrow concepts consists of three levels: Chinese culture in
general, the elite literati culture, and the Yi learning, a particular
philosophical tradition. . . . Some concepts, the most general ones, belonged to the epistemological imperatives of the culture. . . . Acceptance of the epistemological imperatives of the culture is not restricted
to any social group. Although different groups at different times may
understand them differendy, the assumption of their existence is so
basic that they themselves are never questioned. Many of these concepts
may have originated with a particular school of thought, but at some
point they became accepted by the culture as a whole. Moreover, as
society develops, new epistemological imperatives appear. Yin and
Yang, wu-hsing(the five phases),... t'ien-ti (heaven and earth), wan-wu
(the myriad things), ch'i, tao, shen (spirit), and hsin (heart/mind) . . .
are examples of epistemological imperatives of Chinese culture in
[this] time. . . . [T]heir existence was assumed without question and
they were the foundation of other concepts.... The twentieth century
has witnessed the appearance of others, derived in particular from
Marxist thought.
T'ien-ti, "heaven/earth," for example, "asserted the division o f
the universe into two basic realms, the sky and the earth. These
realms existed on the sensorial level o f reality, the level o f appearances and human experience." The concept wan-wu, "the myriad
things," asserted that all the things and events in the world o f human experience are specific, finite, and particular. [Birdwhistell
1989:2-5, 51-52]
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T o find "law" in Chinese science is another matter, and indeed
provides an informative example of the dangers involved in the
transfer of words and concepts from one civilization to another.
"Law" in the sense of a positive command or requirement, even of
nature itself, was unacceptable in traditional China. Needham
goes into detail as to why this should be so, but for present purposes the following abridgement of his statement will suffice to
illustrate the attitude of Chinese science toward rules of nature.
In essence, then, Li is indeed the 'principle of organization' as we
called it when discussing the Neo-Confucians. There is law implicit in it,
but it is a law to which parts of wholes have to conform by virtue of their
very existence as parts of wholes. And this is true whether they are human parts or non-human parts. This 'law' arose not by decree of a universal Controller but direcdy out of the nature of the universe. Li is no
fortuitous concourse of atoms obeying statistical laws of their own either; it is in no way connected with the patterns of chance. The cosmic
order is whole and unchanging; it is a Great Pattern in which lesser
patterns are included, and the laws which are involved are intrinsic to
these patterns, an integral part of them, not extrinsic to them or dominating them as the laws of human society dominate men. . . . We must
conclude, then, that 'law' was understood in an 'organic' sense by the
Neo-Confucian school: law in the sense used in describing the mathematical universe of Newton was either completely absent from their
definition of Li or, at the most, played a very minor part The main
component was 'pattern,' including pattern living and dynamnic to the
fullest extent; in other words, 'organism.' In this philosophy of organism all things were included: thus Heaven, Earth and Man have the
same Li. [Ronan 1978:300]
The concept of "law" as specified above for formal knowledge
systems says nothing about lawgivers and indeed, even modern
Experimental Science would give little thought to that issue. A
law that is intrinsic to its jurisdiction remains a law.
"Procedure" as defined above is one way in which Chinese science was most appreciably different from the modern Western
variety. Experiment and mathematics were not by any stretch of
the imagination the governing rules for determining the validity
of suggested knowledge.
[ 0 ] n e further aspect of [this] explanatory theory concerning
change must be briefly considered: the logic of the system, or the implicit logical principles on which [its] thought is based. As noted earlier, this refers to the system of concepts that specify not only the relations that can hold between the elements of the discourse but also the
way in which questions can be asked. The logic of [this] philosophical
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system of thought was . . . characteristic of thought in general in eleventh-century China.
In terms of the discussion here, the most fundamental assumpdon
was the validity of correlative, or associational, thinking. In this type of
logic, all things in the universe are associated with other things on the
basis of established categories or classes. The categories form a "natural" classification scheme into which all thingsfit.Joseph Needham has
quite apdy called it an immense 'filing system'....
In a system based on correlative logic, the significance or explanation of any event is based on the correlations. Meaning is thought of as
something that indicates the category of correspondence. Understanding and explaining, therefore, involve knowing the classes and knowing
to what other entities the thing or event in question is correlated. Relationships between things are a matter of the categories.. . .
Furthermore, the kinds of questions that can be asked are determined by the logical system or proof structure. For example, with correlative thinking, one does not explain an animal's behavior by asking
whether the behavior is learned or inherited. That kind of question
simply does not belong to the system. One asks, instead, whether the
animal belongs to a yin or a yang category, or to which of the four images the animal corresponds....
The answers were explanations because they helped classify the
functioning of movement and response. [Birdwhistell 1989: 63-64]
In terms o f modern Western Experimental Science such a system is o f course errant nonsense. But then, what was China's first
assessment o f modern Western Experimental Science?
"Myth" in any assessment o f traditional China is obvious; the
entire corpus of traditional Chinese biography was o n e long
study in role models, and should not require further comment.
This completes the initial presentation of the hypothesis o f formal knowledge systems as the core and defining element o f each
civilization. The analysis implies various applications, but only
one will be provided for illustration. Modern international politics has made much o f international morality, without ever establishing how morality is to be determined. If the proposed description o f formal knowledge systems is correct, then it implies a
particular character for the nature o f morality when that term is
applied to a civilization's moral evolution.
N o formal knowledge system is ever completely integrated, because every civilization includes some actual events or characteristics that are deeply offensive to its basic values (e.g., slavery in
the United States, poverty and degradation o f most o f the people
in most Christian societies). By and large these seem to be
handled by compartmentalization; they are walled in with state-
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ments such as "the natural order of things" and people simply
ignore them. Moral progress then occurs when the walls are
breached and the conflict resolved. Note that this does not create
any absolute morality; conflicts can occur with moral values only
when the values are present in the first place. No matter what the
situation, if there is no value in conflict with it, there is no opportunity for moral crisis, nor even for recognition of the possibility.
Note that this interpretation also does not require any particular
solution; it is required only that the conflict be resolved, not that
it be resolved in favor of some particular value. Probably most
people would assess that the greatest moral progress occurs when
the resolution supports the original value, but this seems to reflect only the preconditioning that most people have in favor of
the righteousness of their ingrained moral values. It is quite possible for the moral value itself to be the problem. Present-day Iran
for example has resolved the conflict between Westernization
and its traditional moral assessment of the proper place o f
women by the wholesale reassertion of tradition. But is such repression a higher moral value?
Note further that these positions may vary from one milieu to
another within a single civilization/knowledge system; not all assumptions are covenant, and not all folkways are law. One group
may consider some value a basic assumption while another considers it a derivation from presumed law, while another finds the
whole notion outdated and exceptionally quaint. This variation
applies not only across time and between regions but particularly
as one passes between so-called "high" and "low" culture. A formal knowledge system must have room for low culture, even if
disdainful of it, and for high culture however evanescent its fashions. Evanescence, time, change can also be difficult problems in
themselves. Formal knowledge systems are hypothesized in this
paper to pretend to universality and permanence, so change and
time are things that should be handled very delicately. The preferred method seems to be to go for the first derivative and look
for regularity—the cycles of the phases of the moon, of the year,
of the lifetime. Irregularity and especially chaos are event-types
that should be hard to organize into the permanent universality
preferred by formal knowledge systems, so if organized religions
are indeed such, then irregularity and chaos should tend to be
walled out as beyond the pale, demonic, accursed. The same ap-
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plies to Science, in which for example the new field of chaos
theory intends not to study chaos but to illuminate the order behind it.
It remains finally to apply this hypothesis to the question which
has bedevilled the ISCSC for all its existence. What is "civilization" (in the generic term)? The present hypothesis suggests civilization as a generic term to be the combination of an autonomous formal knowledge system—one not subject to governance
by another—with a group of people who act by it. Within a sort of
hierarchy, each civilization could also contain sub-civilizations
each of which is built around its own formal knowledge system
subordinate to or contained within the overarching one. What is
a particular civilization? What bounds a particular civilizations
and makes them identifiable? It is at this point that the components of a formal knowledge system, and particularly procedure,
become important. It was noted earlier that Catholic and Orthodox Christianity are usually considered separate as of AD 867,
because of the Photian schism. This schism was based on, and
became lasting because, one group did not recognize the changes
made to the faith by the other group (specifically, because one
group did not recognize the decisions of the other's Church
councils as valid and binding). Therefore, this single original formal knowledge system (Christianity) may be held to have split
when one set of partisans did not recognize the other's changes,
thereby allowing development to proceed separately henceforth;
this difference in "procedure" is the point of separation recognized by the churches themselves. Conversely, the acceptance by
Spain and Britain of European procedure (and not just as regards
Church councils) may be said to mark the amalgamation of these
two formerly autonomous regions into Western civilization.
Beyond this is the question of hardware, since Europe and
Byzantium also used different languages as the means of expression of each culture. The influence of hardware is also seen in
east Asia, where one might assign China, Vietnam, Korea and Japan all to a single civilization on the basis of their common usage
of Mandarin Chinese as the vehicle of culture, while Tibet would
be reserved to some kind of greater India because its high culture
was derived principally from Sanskrit. For the moment such a differentiation is particularly useful during the early development of
each civilization, but picks up considerable uncertainty once each
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begins using its vernaculars heavily. Would a distinction according to the language of high culture cause separate civilizations
once the vernaculars become "cultural"? In our own times, would
India be a single civilization? For the moment such questions can
be answered only in a somewhat arbitrary fashion. Therefore, as
of this writing, questions of procedure will be admitted to distinctions of civilizational level, and questions of hardware, while
probably also civilizational in importance, will be reserved to future determination on this point. Thus two definitions are hereby
proposed:
Civilization (generic definition): The presence of a formal
knowledge system, together with the people subscribing to it.
Civilization (individual specimen): A formal knowledge system
or interacting group thereof, with the people subscribing to it/
them, which as a group recognize the same procedures (rules and
institutions for change) as valid and binding.
These definitions may now proceed to testing.
Fort Walton Beach, Florida

NOTES
1. The Mississippian culture-system also included one site, Cahokia,
which was an order of magnitude larger than any of the others; population estimates vary from a low of 5,000 [Griffin 1978:263] to 40,000
[Fowler 1975:100], About AD 1200 this area also supported four "large
towns," five "small towns" and 43 "villages," totalling perhaps 20,000
[Pfeiffer 1977:425] to 50,000 [O'Brien 1990:2] additional population
outside Cahokia itself [see also Fowler 1978: 478-469]. But Cahokia
does not seem to have been the home area of the Southern Cult, and
when historic times began, the abandoned site lay outside the area of
the "civilized tribes," being populated only by the Osage and some
branches of the Sioux, "semi-sedentary" and "closely related to the
Oneota Aspect" of the northern fringe of Mississippian development,
not to Cahokia and the Mississippian core [Chapman 1952: 145-149].
There is some possibility of what is referred to later in the main text of
this paper as a "hardware" difference, in that while the civilized tribes
and most of the area of the Southern Cult spoke Muskhogean languages, Cahokia may have been occupied by Siouan peoples. But this
remains debated.
2. However, one should not be too smug about this. Complexity can
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be built on so simple a difference as that between "0" (zero) and "1";
out endre system of computer language is based on such a purely binary system. Likewise one may build complexity merely on the difference between the solid and broken lines of the Yi-ching, as witness the
Yi-hsueh noted later in the main text of this paper.
3. Even this has come under some question lately, as one of the hypothetically possible consequences of the currently popular inflationary model of the origin of the universe. However, one must suspect that,
if it ever does come to pass that physical law is proven to be local to one
(part of a) universe, then Grand Laws will prompdy be sought that determine the local laws of each area. The situation otherwise would in
scientific terms literally be unthinkable!
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